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ABSTRACT
Korea is far behind other OECD countries in economy-wise productivity: Korea's labor 
productivity in terms of GDP per hour worked is the lowest among OECD countries. Against the 
existing productivity gap, there is a worrying sign in Korea's investment trend － rapid fall in 
machinery and equipment investment with slow increase in R&D investment. The challenge facing 
Korea is how to transform her economy from catching-up model to a knowledge-based one. The 
paper shows that, in tandem with the structural changes that today's Korean industries are 
experiencing, industry's innovation system is also changing. Innovation networks are emerging as 
the result of economy-wise restructuring since the financial crisis of 1997 and, though still not a 
dominant force, the newly emerging innovation networks will be the main threads of industry's 
innovation activities in the future. The changes in industrial innovation system would positively 
contribute in raising the productivity of the Korean economy. The paper contains a case study on 
Korea's automobile industry in order to highlight some of main characteristics of the structural 
changes, in addition to a chapter that gives an overview of the evolutionary paths of the Korea's 
industrial innovation. The paper assesses that changes can be considered as a positive sign of future 
growth perspective; but there are further challenges to make the Korea's industrial innovation 
system effective. The list of such challenges includes strengthening upstream sectors of currently 
leading industries, expanding the innovation base to SME and promoting technological 
co-operation between domestic firms and foreign firms.
한국경제는 경제전반의 생산성에 있어서 
OECD 국가 중 최하위에 있다. 이러한 생
산성 격차와 함께, 한국경제는 구조변화를 
경험하고 있다. 설비투자는 급격하게 감소
하고 있는 반면, 연구개발투자는 크게 확대
되고 있지는 않다. 한국이 당면한 과제는 
과거의 추격성장전략에서 지식기반경제로 
전환하는 것이다. 이를 위한 과제는 무엇인
가? 본 논문은 이 과제를 혁신을 통한 생산
성 제고라는 측면에서 검토하고 있다. 외환
위기 이후 한국의 산업혁신시스템의 괄목
할 만한 변화의 하나는 혁신네트워크가 새
롭게 등장하고 있다는 것이다. 이러한 혁신
네트워크는 향후 산업혁신시스템의 중핵으
로 자리할 것이며, 한국경제의 생산성 제고
에 긍정적으로 기여할 것이다. 본 논문은 
자동차산업에 대한 사례를 통하여 이러한 
변화를 명시적으로 보여준다. 향후 한국 산
업혁신시스템의 강화를 위해서는 산업의 
상위부문의 강화, 중소기업의 혁신기반 확
대 및 국내기업과 외국인기업 사이의 기술
협력 촉진이 필요하다. 
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I. Introduction 
 
 
The production systems in the East Asia that have prevailed over the past years 
are dissolving rapidly, and the world economic environment is also changing 
rapidly. The rapid advances of information technology (IT) are enabling to 
overcome the limitations of physical distances and thereby to organize the 
production activities more effectively through the global supply chains. In line 
with the forces of globalization and IT revolution, the integration of low-cost 
economies to the world economy raises new challenges to national economies, in 
particular to Korea, forcing them to move towards knowledge-based economies. It 
is not sure how long Korea can maintain international competitiveness in her 
flagship exporting products such as textile, automobile and IT products. We have 
found that the basis of international competitiveness of the Korean exporting 
products is not so strong and Korea needs to find out new engines of growth. (KDI, 
2003) The challenges faced by today’s Korean economy would be termed as, in 
need of better words, the transition from the catch-up model to an innovation-
driven economy. What are the requirements for a successful transition?  
As the productivity increase is regarded as crucial factor for long-term 
economic growth, the process of innovation, a broad concept of productivity 
increase, not only attracts the attention of academic research but also it becomes 
recognized as an important policy issue. For instance, comparing the economic 
performances between Europe and US from a long time-horizon, Gordon (2004) 
concludes that whether the process of input accumulation comes up with the 
sustained growth critically depends on the pace of innovation. Productivity 
increases seem to be closely related to the increases in capital-labor ratio, but 
capital accumulation without innovation does not end up with economy-wise 
increases in productivity. More comprehensive research of OECD (2001 and 2003a) 
on the sources of economic growth also concludes that, in addition to the 
accumulation of production inputs, differences of economic growth are critically 
depends upon some institutional and system factors that governs the pace of 
technological advances. The list of those factors includes not only the quality of 
production inputs, it also broadly includes such institutional factors as the 
education system that produces better qualified human resources and the research 
and development (R&D) system that promotes industrial innovation and diffusion 
of new technologies. 
In terms of economy-wise productivity, Korea is far behind other OECD 
countries. According to OECD (2003b), controlling the effect of labor utilization, 
Korea’s labor productivity in terms of GDP per hour worked is the lowest among 
OECD countries. Against the existing productivity gap, we have seen a worrying 
sign in Korea’s investment trend. It is worth reminding that Korea has shown very 
high machinery and equipment (M&E) investment ratio in the past years, but the 
trend is reversing recent years. Compared two period between 1993-1997 and 1998-
2002, OECD economies on the average has increased M&E investment from 9.4% 
to 10.8%, in terms of percentage average as of GDP. In contrast, Korea has shown 
???? ? ? ?  ???????????????? 
decreases from 13.8% to 11.2%. Concerning business R&D investment, most of 
OECD countries have shown an increasing trend and Korea as well but not enough 
to compensate the decreases in M&E investment.1  
Does the changes in investment structure outlined above imply only the fact 
that the Korean economy is being matured? Is there any sign that hints more 
fundamental changes in industry?  
This paper will show that, in tandem with the structural changes that today’s 
Korean industries are experiencing, industry’s innovation system is also changing. 
Innovation networks are emerging as the result of economy-wise restructuring 
since the financial crisis of 1997 and, though still not a dominant force, the newly 
emerging innovation networks will be the main threads of industry’s innovation 
activities in the future. The changes in industrial innovation system would 
positively contribute in raising the productivity of the Korean economy. The paper 
is organized as follows. Section 2 will summarizes the main features of structural 
changes in Korean industries as a background for the later sections. This section 
includes the case of automobile industry in order to highlight some of main 
characteristics of the structural changes. Section 3 will give an overview of the 
evolutionary paths of the Korea’s industrial innovation. This section would help 
understand the implications of the newly emerging industrial innovation system, 
which are documented in section 4. Section 4 focuses on the changes in industrial 
innovation system with special attention on SMEs and the innovation networks 
among firms. The section also includes case study on SMEs in automobile industry. 
The changes can be considered a positive sign of future growth perspective but 
there are further challenges to make the Korea’s industrial innovation system 
effective. Section 5 concludes the paper by discussing the implications of changes 
in industrial innovation system. 
 
 
II. Structural Changes in Korean Industry2 
 
 
The Korean economy has experienced gradual changes in its industrial 
structure since the 1980s, where, as the industrialization process matured, the share 
of manufacturing became saturated while service sectors as a whole tended to take 
more portion in gross economic activities. The manufacturing sector has started to 
account for smaller shares in the late 1980s. However, its shares have recovered to 
the previous level after starting to increase in the second half of the 1990s: the 
manufacturing sector has shown the high growth rate since the mid-1990s. And 
productivity in the manufacturing sector has been greatly improved; particularly, 
high productivity increase is found in manufacturing firms that survived the 
financial crisis with successful restructuring.  
????????????????????????????????????????????
1 The data in the text are based on two sources: www.sourceoecd.org and OECD Main Science and Technology 
Indicators.  
2 This section reports the findings of KDI project on Korea’s industrial competitiveness. For more details, see 
KDI (2003). 
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Over the long-term period, the manufacturing sector maintained a stable level, 
whereas the service sector has been stagnant. Above all, productivity in the service 
industry is lower than that of manufacturing. In this regard, even though the 
service industry takes a larger share in terms of employment, its share is constant 
in terms of added value. This fact implies that enhancing productivity in the 
service sector is the crux of raising the overall economic growth rate.  
Within the manufacturing industry, intervals of business scales widen both in 
inter- and intra-sectors. Its expanding gaps in inter-sectors are the most evident in 
inter-sectoral differences in terms of growth rate and total factor productivity (TFP) 
growth. The electronics and automobile sectors lead a large part of the growth rate 
of the manufacturing industry and TFP growth. Especially, these growth rates are 
ascribable to the rapid productivity increase mainly by large conglomerates since 
the 1990s. Furthermore, according to findings of productivity analysis of 
manufacturing by sub-sectors and by five groups of firm-scale, the higher growth 
rates are found in electronics and automobiles, with the larger share led by 
conglomerates. And these conglomerate firms make a higher contribution to the 
growth rate of productivity and increasing productivity. These analysis results 
show that large conglomerates are expected to maintain the leading role in the 
growth of the manufacturing industry for the time being. In contrast, except for the 
smallest firm-cohort with less than 10 employees, smaller firms show poor records 
in productivity growth. The productivity improvement of smaller firms is an 
important task for sustainable growth and improvement of the competitiveness in 
manufacturing in general.  
The phenomenon of widening gaps among inter-sectors and inter-firms which 
we call bifurcation or polarization is also identified in the analysis of financial 
structure. According to the results analyzing financial stability and profitability 
from 1990 to 2002, while both total assets and tangible asset investments have been 
on a downwards trend since the financial crisis, the gaps widen between large 
conglomerates and SMEs. In addition to this deepening polarization, signs of a 
decrease in increasing rate of tangible assets give rise to apprehension in light of an 
expansion of growth potential. However, as KDI study noted in the chapter 
reviewing R&D activities of firms, we have found a positive sign of the possibility 
that the Korean economy is in the process of transforming into an innovation-
driven economy as the number of technology-intensive SMEs dramatically 
increases after the financial crisis.  
 
 
1. Widening Productivity Gaps 
 
We used the plant-level manufacturing survey data for 1984-2001 compiled by 
the National Statistical Office. The data were re-compiled according to the 29-
sector classification system of the KDI Multi-Sector Model, and, for five major 
industries, the data were rearranged into sub-industries according to the supply 
chain in each industry. The plants were classified into five categories according to 
the number of workers, and the analysis was performed for three sub-periods; 
1985-89, 1989-97 and 1998-2001. We estimated both single-factor productivity, such 
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as labor productivity and capital productivity, and total factor productivity (TFP), 
which was estimated by both the growth accounting method and multi-lateral 
method.  
(1) Labor Productivity: Huge gaps of labor productivity were observed among 
industries and among size groups. The basic metals and electronics industries 
showed high labor productivity while textiles and garments, metal products, 
precision instruments industries showed a low level. We could also find that larger 
plants recorded higher labor productivity for the entire period, and that the gaps 
are widening. Analysis on the growth rate of labor productivity also showed a 
similar pattern. Specifically, the electronics industry showed an overwhelmingly 
high growth rate, and machinery and transportation equipment industries showed 
comparably high growth rates, while textiles and garments, paper products and 
publishing, and metal products industries recorded extremely low growth rates. 
Overall growth rate has persistently risen, with an exceptionally low growth rate 
right after the economic crisis. Analysis on the growth rate of labor productivity by 
plant size reveals an important result. We found that, over the entire period, larger 
plants recorded higher growth rates. However, we found, in addition, that smaller 
plants showed higher growth rates in the first sub-period (1985-89), that this trend 
reversed in the second sub-period (1989-97), and that the gaps widened in the third 
sub-period (1998-2001) when productivity growth was led mostly by large firms.  
(2) Capital Productivity: Capital productivity shows a relatively stable time-
series, and the gaps among industries and among firm sizes are reducing, except 
for several industries. Capital productivity by plant size shows an “inverted U” 
shape, i.e., the plants with medium size show the highest capital productivity.  
(3) Total Factor Productivity (TFP): Annual average growth rate of TFP for 
1985-2001, computed by the growth accounting method, for the entire manu- 
facturing sector was estimated to be 4.33 percent. It was estimated slightly higher 
than 4 percent until the late 1990s, but rose sharply up to 11.68 percent after the 
economic crisis. The food and beverage, textiles and garments, and precision 
instrument industries showed slow TFP growth for the entire period, while the 
electronics industry showed an extremely high TFP growth rate, high enough to 
lead the TFP growth of entire manufacturing sector. The machinery and 
transportation equipment industries, in addition to electronics industry, also 
recorded high TFP growth rates, and these industries recorded remarkably high 
TFP growth in late 1990s. Growth pattern of TFP by plant size shows a trend 
highly similar to that of labor productivity. That is, smaller firms revealed higher 
TFP growth rates in the first sub-period, but the trend reversed in the second sub-
period, and the gaps widened in the third sub-period. Estimation by multilateral 
index method showed almost the same results.  
In conclusion, it can be said that the growth and technological progress of the 
manufacturing sector has been led by the electronics and automobile industries, 
and, in particular, by the fast productivity growth of large firms in the 1990s. This 
can be explained by the fact that the shares of large firms are relatively big in the 
industries with fast productivity growth. It is expected that the growth of the 
manufacturing sector led mostly by large firms will persist for the time being. At 
the same time, however, it is necessary to pay special attention to the increasing  
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[Figure 1] Labor Productivity by Industry and Firm-size 
 
 
[Figure 2] Total Factor Productivity Growth by Industry and Firm-size 
Note: T & C = textile & clothing, E & E = electrical & electronic products. 
 
share of smallest firms and to the slow productivity growth of medium-size firms 
(with 100 to 300 workers). It would be impossible to sustain a high growth rate and 
improved competitiveness in the manufacturing sector without sufficient 
productivity growth of small- and medium-size firms. 
 
 
2. The Case of Automobile Industry 
 
Labor productivity of parts producers has been increasing since 1980s. As is  
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[Figure 3] Labor Productivity of Automobile and Parts Industry 
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[Figure 4] Labor Productivity of Automobile Parts Industry, by Size 
of Firms 
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Note: size 1 = 1~9 employees, size 2 = 10~19 employees, size 3 = 20~99 employees, size 4 = 
100~299 employees, size 5 = more than 299 employees. 
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shown in Figure 3, it had peaked at the year of 1996, and decreased for two years 
from 1997 and 1998. The growing trend seems to be resurrected after the financial 
crisis, despite a sharp decrease in 2001. Since 1997, labor productivity in the domestic 
automobile industry has revitalized its growth trend. The labor productivity in the 
complete cars industry has been increasing rapidly and productivity in the parts 
industry has been maintaining a steady growth trend. However, the productivity 
gap between the two sectors is ever increasing. In 2001, the value added per capita in 
the domestic automobile industry recorded the highest level it has ever been. Despite 
productivity in the parts industry continually growing, it has not yet recovered to 
previous levels before the financial crisis. It is interesting to compare the productivity 
trend between parts producers and carmakers. Compared to carmakers, the parts 
sector has improve its relative labor productivity until 1990 when it was reached 56% 
of carmakers. For the 1990s, the parts sector had maintained around 55% of 
productivity level compared to carmakers, with some fluctuations. The productivity 
gap has been widened since 1998. Within the parts sector, there are great 
productivity differences among size-groups of firms. Large firms and medium-sized 
firms with 100 to 299 employees show more than sector-average productivity levels 
over the years, with exceptions in the 1980s. In contrast, smaller firms show lower 
than sector average productivity levels.  
The productivity gap between the different size-groups has been maintained 
with short fluctuations. What are the factors underlying the persistent productivity 
gap in automobile parts industry? An immediate message is that scale economies 
are prevailing in the automobile parts industry. We will review several aspects of 
production activities in two sectors, which shows structural differences between 
them. And we will investigate the TFP trends in two sectors, which is a source of 
persistent productivity gap.  
TFP level of the complete vehicle manufacturers, by both methods of growth 
accounts and multilateral index, has been increasing for last 10 years. In case of the 
parts industry, it experienced a drop during the period 1990-97, and since the crisis, 
has been on an upward trend. Until the mid 1990s, the TFP level of the vehicle 
industry was lower than the parts industry’s, mainly due to over investments 
made by many vehicle manufacturers. After the crisis, the vehicle industry's TFP 
growth has increased rather rapidly, while the parts industry has experienced little 
change. As a result, the TFP gap between the vehicle and parts industry has 
widened. According to the analysis by way of the growth accounts method, the 
TFP growth of large companies has greatly increased almost to the level of 1980s 
following the crisis, while that of SMEs shows a decreasing trend. However, when 
applying the multilateral index, excluding small firms with less than 10 employees, 
the rest of the companies in the industry have shown a growth tendency. The TFP 
growth of large firms has increased at a fast rate. As a result, the TFP gap between 
the vehicle and parts industry widened. 
Table 2 shows four indicators that characterize the structural differences 
between parts producers and carmakers. The first indicator is capital-labor ratio, 
the value of equipment capital per employees3. Carmakers are more capital- 
????????????????????????????????????????????
3 Capital-labor ratio can be calculated by using different measures of capital stock, including land, plant and 
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<Table 1> TFP Growth 
(unit: %) 
 Growth accounting Multilateral index approach 
 1985~1989 1989~1997 1998~2001 Whole period 1985~1989 1989~1997 1998~2001 
size 1 9.77 7.51 4.76 5.47 1.02 1.18 4.48 
size 2 5.62 7.16 -2.41 3.44 -0.57 1.51 -0.90 
size 3 2.03 4.91 2.13 2.05 -2.21 0.72 1.60 
size 4 5.76 4.00 2.69 3.06 -0.14 1.01 2.69 
size 5 11.07 0.53 12.08 2.94 2.83 0.57 1.88 
Parts 7.34 2.89 4.75 2.57 1.01 0.74 1.97 
Cars -0.89 4.99 25.99 2.91 -0.96 2.50 6.27 
 
 
<Table 2> Structural Characteristics 
Capital-labor 
ratio1) 
Labor income share
to Value-added (%) 
Average income  
per employee2) 
Share of exports  
to sales (%) 
 
1990 2001 1990 2001 1990 2001 1990 2001 
size 1 
size 2 
size 3 
size 4 
size 5 
8.27 
8.73 
12.01 
15.37 
19.39 
18.63 
18.75 
23.33 
43.68 
66.10 
52.69 
47.41 
42.26 
40.99 
32.15 
79.12 
78.25 
68.93 
60.79 
70.67 
8.41 
7.82 
8.60 
11.07 
15.23 
20.00 
18.28 
19.86 
27.89 
38.85 
7.99 
1.49 
4.72 
8.57 
8.83 
2.35 
6.99 
9.16 
21.90 
26.95 
Parts 14.91 36.83 37.15 67.43 11.36 25.73 7.66 18.91 
Vehicle 31.51 97.41 43.40 32.22 21.72 46.59 21.94 46.68 
Notes: size 1 = 1~9 employees, size 2 = 10~19 employees, size 3 = 20~99 employees, size 4 = 100~299 
employees, size 5 = more than 299 employees. 
1) Equipment stock per employee in million won, 1995 constant price.  
2) In million won, 1995 constant price.  
Source: Calculated from National Statistical Office, Manufacturing Census, each year.  
 
 
intensive than parts producers - on the average workers in the former has capital 
equipment around 2.6 times than those in the latter sector, a high increase from 2.1 
times in 1990. In terms of capital-labor ratio, the gap is also widening between 
carmakers and parts producers. The second indicator is labor-income share of 
value-added, which is measured by dividing labor compensation over value-
added4. For the parts producers this indicator has increased greatly from 37% in 
1990 to 67% in 2001, whereas for the carmakers it has decreased from 43% to 32%. 
two more indicators average income and exports share, also show differences 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
transportation equipment. But there is no substantial difference in terms of magnitude and ratio between carmakers 
and parts producers.  
4 Labor-income share can be calculated by dividing it to total output. But the result shows no difference on the 
gap between carmakers and parts producers.  
??????? ?????????? ????????????? ?????? ????????’??????????????????????? ??????????? ?????????????? 
[Figure 5] Growth Paths of Carmakers and Parts Producers 
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between carmakers and parts producers. Average income of employees in parts 
sector is around 26 million one per year in 2001, which is far lower than that in 
vehicle sector5. The difference between two sectors is also conspicuous in terms of 
exports share, which shows that carmakers are far more export-oriented than parts 
producers are. It is also interesting to note that there are great differences among 
different size-groups of firms within the parts sector: the larger the firm the more 
capital intensive, highly paid and export-oriented.  
Figure 5 shows these two indicators over longer years, comparing carmakers 
and parts producers. Capital-labor ratio of carmakers has been consistently 
increased since the 1980s, whereas that of parts producers had slowly increased 
until the year of financial crisis in 1997 but has remained stagnant afterwards. 
Instead, parts producers show steady increases in labor share of value-added, 
which implies that parts producers depends more on labor in their production 
process. Capital deepening of carmakers and increased dependency on labor by 
parts producers results in widening gap in labor productivity between carmakers 
and parts producers.  
 
 
3. Technology and R&D 
 
The steady increase of automobile and parts exports over the years, as shown in 
the previous section, indicates that international competitiveness of Korea-made 
automobiles is also enhancing. What are the factors positively affecting the 
international competitiveness of Korea cars? One will be the Korean automobile 
????????????????????????????????????????????
5 Hong (2004) points out two factors for the wage difference. First, differences in labor composition – large 
companies are composed of more skilled workers whereas smaller companies less skilled and women workers. 
Second, differences in payment capability - large contractor companies have bargaining power over smaller 
subcontracting companies, which results in lower wages for workers in the latter. Lansbury and Zappala (1990) hint 
that highly paying exporting firms are subcontracting low-paying smaller firms.  
???? ? ? ?  ???????????????? 
parts. Being suppliers to the carmakers, the technological competence of parts 
producers are directly affecting the competitiveness of Korea’s automobiles. There 
have been strong concerns over the weaknesses, in particular weak technological 
competence, of Korea’s automobile parts producers that erode the international 
competitiveness of Korean cars. For example, compared with Japanese competitors, 
Korea’s automobile parts industry as a whole seems weak in their technological 
capabilities in terms of R&D intensity as in Table 3 below. In contrast, Korean 
carmakers appear comparable to Japanese ones in terms of R&D intensity, despite 
the time lag of developing a new car. Considering the fact that Korea’s automobile 
parts imports is negligible and Korean cars are using mostly Korean parts, this 
concern raises a contradiction. We will show that this concern is misplaced. We 
contend that automobile parts producers are strengthening their technological 
activities but there is a notable difference between those very active in R&D 
activities and those not, and those large companies and smaller companies. It is 
worth noting that not all the automobile parts producers are in this trend but there 
is a trend of divergence within the automobile parts industry.  
R&D activities of automobile parts industry have been steadily increased from 
1995 to 2002, except a sharp decrease in 1998 when the financial crisis overrode the 
Korean economy. The number of R&D- performing firms is increasing from 152 in 
1995 to 223 in 2002. R&D expenditures of industry as a whole have also been 
increased, roughly two times during the same period. R&D intensity, as the ratio of 
R&D expenditures to sales, has not increased, compared the periods between pre- 
and post-crisis years, but it is partly due to the business cycles. Looking at the 
number of researchers, it is apparent that industry as a whole is strengthening 
R&D activities: number of researchers and researchers per 100 employees are in an 
increasing trend. The increasing trend of automobile parts industry is quite 
contrasting to the stagnant trend of automobile industry. Consequently, the ratios 
of parts producers to carmakers in terms of R&D expenditures and researchers in 
2002 have reached 38% and 84%, respectively.  
The following Table 5 groups automobile parts producers into four size cohorts. 
Average R&D expenditures of four groups increase as the size of the company 
increases, whereas smaller company groups show higher R&D intensities. The 
same pattern will be found with respect to researchers: average number of 
researchers increase according to the firm-size, but smaller group show higher 
magnitude in the researchers per employee. It is interesting to notice that average 
R&D expenditures per researcher do not show great differences, though smallest 
group shows the lowest magnitude. Now, comparing parts producers with 
carmakers, there are significant differences. The greatest difference is the amount 
of R&D expenditures and the number of researchers: even the largest group of 
parts suppliers spends about one-fifth of carmakers, and the number of researchers 
employed by parts producers are less than half of those of carmakers. It is a well-
known fact that the larger the size of the firm, the more likely the firm performs 
R&D activities, and Korea’s automobile parts producers also show the same 
pattern6. All the carmakers are doing R&D activities and it is apparent that the big  
????????????????????????????????????????????
6 According to Suh (2002), only 3.06% of Korean manufacturing firms are performing R&D activities in 2000. 
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<Table 3> Technology Indicators: Korea vs. Japan 
(As of 2000) 
 Korea Japan 
Automotive parts producers 1.6% 7.7% The share of R&D  
personel to employees Carmakers 8.1% 8.7% 
Time to develop a new car 50 months 36 months 
Source: Korea Auto Industries Cooperation Association, Handbook on Korea’s Auto Industry, 2002.? ?
?
?
<Table 4> R&D Indicators of Korea’s Automobile and Parts Industry 
R&D Expenditure Researchers  
Number of R&D- 
performing firms 
Amount of  
investment 
(billion won) 
As of sales 
(%) 
Number of  
persons 
Per 100  
employees 
Automobile parts industry 
1995 152 236.16 2.41 3074 3.97 
1996 168 346.71 3.02 3700 4.96 
1997 156 324.71 2.76 3746 5.46 
1998 119 231.32 2.95 2772 5.62 
1999 140 272.02 2.13 4001 6.94 
2000 167 330.08 1.64 3998 6.11 
2001 193 320.49 1.91 3818 6.20 
2002 223 447.61 2.07 4748 7.16 
Automobile industry 
1995 15 1230.70 4.91 7261 5.69 
1996 17 1494.88 5.17 8047 6.15 
1997 14 1644.84 5.69 7793 7.71 
1998 11 1237.68 7.83 7897 9.51 
1999 12 852.17 2.90 6079 5.27 
2000 12 1108.28 3.02 5241 5.42 
2001 24 1091.07 2.51 5665 3.68 
2002 19 1194.37 2.44 5633 5.53 
Source: Author’s calculation from the raw data from Ministry of Science and Technology, Report on the 
Survey of Research and Development in Science and Technology, each year.  
 
 
size of carmakers gives an advantage of mobilizing R&D resources, compared to 
smaller parts producers. 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
The size distribution is as follows: 1.9% for firms with less than 100 employees, 25.6% for those with 100-299 
employees, 64.2% for those with 300-999 employees and 94.8% for firms with 1,000 or more employees.  
???? ? ? ?  ???????????????? 
[Figure 6] The Ratio of Automobile Parts Industry to Automobile Industry 
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<Table 5> R&D Activity by Firm-size 
Automobile parts producers (By size of employee)  
Less than 100 100 to 299 300 to 999 1000 and more All 
Carmakers 
Number of firms 54 75 57 9 194 18 
Average R&D  
expenditure 
(million won) 
359.9 969.2 2647.7 13,668.8 1886.9 62,846.9 
Ratio to sales (%) 2.63 3.81 2.30 1.78 1.68 1.88 
Average number 
of researchers 5.8 10.9 30.3 147.0 21.5 306.2 
Researchers per  
100 employees 11.2 5.9 5.9 7.2 6.5 4.7 
R&D exp. per  
researcher 
(million won) 
62.0 88.3 87.3 93.0 87.4 205.2 
Note: Three-year average from 2000 to 2002. 
Source: Author’s compilation from raw data from MOST. 
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III. Korea’s Innovation System: Catching-up Model in Brief 
 
 
Although Korea, as a late-industrializing country, has depended heavily on 
foreign technologies, Korea has also made concerted efforts to accumulate 
technological capabilities. When beginning to launch economy-wide economic 
development plan, Korea was poorly endowed with necessary factors for 
industrialisation except plenty of labour force. Further, technological competence 
of Korean firms was far below from world standard. Consequently, it was 
inevitable or natural to seek for foreign sources of technologies. After the 
industrialisation process launched in 1962, imports of foreign technologies grew 
remarkably. The process of technological capability building in Korea is 
characterised as a dynamic process of the interplay between imported technologies 
and indigenous R&D efforts. Reviewing the process of industrialization since the 
1960's, there appears a general pattern of technological development across 
industries with some industry-specific variations. Table 6 presents the pattern in 
Korea’s machinery industry. The Table shows that technology transfer and in-
house R&D are two principal modes of building technological capability in 
machinery sector and other industries in general. 
 
 
<Table 6> The Process of Technological Capability Building in Korea’s Machinery 
Industry 
 The process of development Technology imports Production and R&D 
 
1960s  
– 1970s 
Policy goal: establishment  
of production base  
Characteristics: heavy  
dependence on imported  
technologies 
Packaged technology:  
turn-key based plants  
Assembling technology 
 
 
Knock-down type  
Production system  
OEM-dominated  
Almost no in-house  
R&D 
 
Early  
1980s 
Policy goal: promotion of  
self-reliance  
Characteristics: Import- 
substitution, localisation of  
parts/components production 
Unpackaged technology:  
parts/components- 
related technology  
Operation technology 
 
OEM/own brand:  
High ratio  
Product development  
In-house R&D starts 
 
 
Late 1980s 
– 1990s 
Policy goal: export-promotion  
by means of expansion of  
domestic market  
Characteristics: beginning of  
plant exports, learning  
advanced and core  
technologies 
Materials-related technolog
y 
Control technology  
Design technology  
High-quality product tech. 
 
 
 
OEM/own brand:  
low ratio  
Product innovation  
Process improvement 
 
 
 
???? ? ? ?  ???????????????? 
Source: Suh(2000). 
??????? ?????????? ????????????? ?????? ????????’??????????????????????? ??????????? ?????????????? 
During the early stages of industrialization, technologies are imported in 
packaged forms. Turnkey-based plant imports were most common during those 
years. And assembling technologies were imported for the purpose of knocked-
down assembly and/or OEM-based production. Then, afterwards, self-sufficiency 
of technology was enthusiastically pursued, although it was not achieved in a short 
period. Localization of some technologies was one of the main goals both for 
government and the private firms. In this period imported technologies changed to 
unpackaged ones and the importation of operation technology increased in order 
to enhance the productivity. After achieving, in some extent, the goal to promote 
self-reliant technologies, the next step is to let Korean products enter into world 
markets. In doing this, expansion of domestic markets was necessitated. In this 
period, imported technologies are relatively more sophisticated and advanced, and 
material-related technologies and control and design technologies were imported. 
Throughout whole periods the ratio of OEM to own brand name (OBN) has 
steadily decreased.  
The pattern of technology transfer differs slightly across industries, particularly 
in the early years. Unit production industries, such as shipbuilding and machinery, 
mainly relied on formal transfer in the form of licensing and consultancy for the 
initial erection of production facilities and design of products. Mass production 
industries, such as electronics and automobiles, also depended on formal transfer 
but to lesser extent. Instead, more emphasis was placed on engineering efforts for 
implementation. Continuous process industries, such as chemicals, cement, paper, 
and steel, were established on a turn-key basis. Since then and throughout the 
1970s and 1980s, technology imports prevailed, and it is still an important tool for 
technological innovation. Recently, however, the outsourcing of foreign 
technologies has become more sophisticated, and the modes of technology transfer 
have tended to be diversified and complex. Exchanges or alliances, for the mutual 
benefit of both parties, are beginning to take the place of unilateral technology 
imports. Further, interest in foreign technologies is shifting towards more high-
tech areas and/or design technologies, and the scope of foreign partners has 
widened considerably. 
The growth pattern of private sector's R&D activities also shows a similar 
pattern outlined above. During the earlier period of industrialization, systematic 
in-house R&D efforts were hard to find out. It was not until the 1980's that Korean 
firms endeavoured to make efforts to build in-house technological capability via 
institutionalising the R&D activities. In the early 1980's R&D activities of private 
firms were closely related to adaptation and assimilation of imported technologies. 
Product development was main features of R&D in those years. Afterwards, based 
on accumulated experiences and knowledge, a number of firms in some specific 
industries have been able to make some innovations in product. In these years, 
efforts to improve production process have been continued.  
The pattern outlined above can be clearly illustrated by Figure 7. It plots the 
trend of the relationship between technology imports (TI) noted as payment for 
foreign technology licensing fees and indigenous R&D efforts noted in terms of 
R&D expenditure over industrial production from 1973 to 2002. Over the years the 
trend changed substantially. Until the early 1980s, indigenous R&D efforts had 
???? ? ? ?  ???????????????? 
remained at an insignificant level; but afterwards R&D intensities have increased 
considerably. Consequently, the overall relationships between imported 
technologies and indigenous R&D effort changes from the previously substituting 
to complementing ones. The Figure shows that the trend of relationship changed 
around the year of 1982. The turning is not accidental: this year marks the launch 
of NRDP and since this year private enterprises have begun to establish in-house 
R&D laboratories. 
The changing relationship between TI and R&D can be originated mainly from 
two sources: private enterprise’s increased R&D efforts and government’s policy 
changes. Throughout the 1980's TI increased steadily and maintained its pace. But 
in-house systematic R&D efforts by private sector have begun to prevail since the 
early 1980's. Underlying this change, three driving forces, inter alia, have been into 
action. First, as Korean economy moved to technology-intensive industries, foreign 
sourcing of technology could not meet the required technological standards. And 
as foreign firms tend to be more reluctant to release their technologies, it becomes 
harder to acquire advanced technologies solely by depending on conventional 
means of technology imports. Lastly, the cost advantage originated from cheap and 
skilled labour came to be exhausted after the early 1980's. Therefore, Korean firms 
tend to feel the necessity to develop their own technological capabilities. 
 
 
[Figure 7] Changing Relationship between Royalty Payment and R&D (1976-2002) 
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Source: Author’s compilation.  
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IV. The Changes in Business R&D Activities7 
 
 
1. SMEs in transition 
 
In the past years, large firms played a leading role in industrial R&D activities. 
Since the early 1980s, private enterprises began to establish in-house R&D centers, 
and large firms established most of them at that time. For example, the Directory of 
Korean Technology Centers published by Korea Industrial Research Institutes in 1985 
listed 141 industrial R&D centers, out of which only 15 centers belonged to SMEs. 
Another characteristic of industrial R&D activities in past years is their mostly 
adaptive nature. This was mainly because R&D activities were to assist the 
production of mature products. Technologies invented elsewhere were transferred 
by licensing contracts or other means of technology transfer, and adapting those 
transferred technologies to the requirements of the production process was the 
major goal of industrial R&D activities. 
The trend has changed, particularly since the financial crisis in 1997. As shown 
in Figure 8 although SMEs are still responsible than less than one third of total 
R&D expenditures, their spending is increasing more rapidly than that of large 
enterprises (LEs), which results in an increase in SMEs’ share. During the period 
1995 and 2001, SMEs’ share of total industrial R&D expenditures has been doubled. 
Do the increased R&D spending by SMEs and their increased R&D share imply 
that SMEs’ role in industrial innovation activities is also increasing?  
 
 
[Figure 8] R&D Expenditure by SMEs and its Share of Total R&D 
Expenditure 
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Source: Ministry of Science & Technology, Report on the Survey of Research and Development 
in Science and Technology, each year. 
????????????????????????????????????????????
7 This section is based on Suh (2003). 
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[Figure 9] Classification of SME by Activities 
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?
Source: Korea Federation of Small and Medium Business. 
 
Today’s SME in Korea face a challenge to strengthen their technological cap- 
abilities and thereby to move up to higher ladder of value chains. Unlike the new 
technology-based firms (NTBF) or those small numbers of firms that can make 
partnership relations with chaebols or other firms, however, the prospect for the 
rest of SME is not necessarily positive.  
Figure 9 below8 gives a snapshot on the current status of manufacturing SME 
in Korea. The figure classifies manufacturing SME into three: those that are actively 
exporting, those that are spending money for R&D, and those are certified as 
“venture”. Exporting can be interpreted as a measure to indicate firm’s overall 
competitiveness; R&D spending as a measure of firm’s technological capability; 
and venture certification as an entrepreneurial capability to enter into a new 
business. Intuitive conclusions can be drawn from the figure. Most of Korean SME 
are home market-oriented that only about 12% manufacturing SME are actively 
engaged in exporting, which might imply that they are vulnerable to market 
opening. In terms of technological capability, about 18% SME have ever spent 
????????????????????????????????????????????
8 The data are from Korea Federation of Small and Medium Business. “Active exporting” firms are 
those that exporting more than 30% of total sales.  
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money for R&D purpose – an increase by 10 percentage point from 1998. This 
implies that majorities of SMEs are weak in their technological capabilities; but 
there is a positive sign of increase. In contrast, the fact that 9 % of manufacturing 
SME get the certification of “venture”- a significant increase from 3% in 1998 - 
might be a promising indicator for the prospect of Korea’s SME in the future9. It is 
interesting to see that the share of those SMEs in active exporting category 
decreased by 10 percentage-point from 1998 to 2002. One possible explanation is 
that as more foreign firms are entering into Korea, SME are directly supplying their 
products to multinationals in Korea.10 The study in the following section will give 
substantive evidence on the changes that Korean SMEs have experienced. 
 
 
2. The Case of SMEs in Automobile Parts Industry 
 
SMEs in automobile parts industry have usually grown as subcontractors to 
domestic automobile companies or domestic large automobile parts companies. 
The existence of automobile companies affords small and medium sized 
automobile parts companies, whether they are first or lower tier subcontractors, 
the leverage to secure home market for growth. And large automobile and parts 
companies had lead industry’s technology development activities so that smaller 
parts companies had made more efforts for producing cost-effective products 
meeting the requirements set by the contractors. The stable relationships between 
parts suppliers and large companies in the automobile industry began to be 
dissolved even before the financial crisis. The growth of domestic automobile 
market had been saturated since the early 1990s when domestic demand for 
automobile did no longer grow as fast as the previous years. It was the automobile 
companies to breach the limitations of domestic market size by increasing exports; 
but most of smaller subcontractors had still remained inactive in exporting.  
Along with market and demand conditions already in change, the financial 
crisis accelerated the changes and smashed the existing business relationships in 
automobile and parts industry. There has been a structural change in global 
automobile industry. Fierce competition among automobile manufacturers in the 
world and the changes in the way to produce automobile and to procure parts are 
the basic forces behind the structural changes in the world automobile industry. 
Korea’s automobile and parts companies have sensed the changing business 
environment for years. It is fair to say that the financial crisis would have 
accelerated the restructuring in the Korea’s automobile and parts companies.  
First, restructuring of automobile manufacturers. The history of Korea’s 
automobile manufacturers coincides with that of Chaebols. Backed up by the 
expansion strategies of Chaebols, automobile business was considered as having a 
strategic value for the rapid growth of Chaebols. But the aggressive expansion 
strategy coupled with the financial crisis placed most of automobile companies 
????????????????????????????????????????????
9 Despite the debate on the nature of “venture” in Korea, it is evident that venture activities in Korea 
are very active. An indicator is the investment in venture capital as a percentage of GDP. OECD (2003) 
shows that Korea is one of countries above OECD average.  
10 This needs further study afterwards.  
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into financial difficulty that led to changes in ownership. Daewoo Group acquired 
Ssangyong Motor Company in 1998. But Daewoo Group went bankrupt only 2 
years after taking over Ssangyong Motor Company, putting Ssangyong’s fate in 
question. Samsung Motor Company, which was established in 1997, could not go 
through the travails of the financial crisis, and it was finally taken over by Renault 
in 2000. Kia Motor Company was taken over by Hyundai Motor Company in 2000, 
and GM finally decided to take over Daewoo Motor Company in 2002.  
Second, merger and acquisition of insolvent or bankrupt automobile parts 
companies by foreign companies. Many parts companies that had financial 
problems were handed over to the foreign companies. Mando, the largest 
automobile parts company in Korea, is a good example. Mando had been affiliated 
with Halla Group, one of the leading Chaebols. Because of Halla’s insolvency, 
Mando, despite its high productivity and relatively sound financial status, was 
split; and, several production plants were sold out to foreign companies including 
Valeo, Visteon, Autoliv and Gibbs. In addition to these foreign companies, several 
other foreign companies such as Delphi, Robert Bosch, VDO, BorgWarner, Siemens, 
TRW, and Denso have enterted into the Korean market by M&A or joint ventures  
?
?
[Figure 10] Restructuring of Korea’s Automobile Industry 
 
Source: Adapted from Kyeong-won Kim (2003) and KAICA (2004). 
<1997>        <2002> 
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<Table 7> Major FDI after the Financial Crisis of 1997 
Investor Name of Korean company Amount (1,000 $) 
Share 
(%) Year 
Delphi (USA) Korea Delphi  58,201 50 2000 
Delphi (USA) Delphi A. S. Sungwoo 60,135 100 2000 
TRW (USA) TRW Steering Korea 13,959 71 2000 
Tower Automotive (USA) SeoJin Ind. 42,383 82 1999 
Visteon (USA) DuckYang Ind. 24,112 51 2001 
Siemens Automotive (GER) Korea EMS 40,682 51 2001 
Valeo (FRA) Valeo Mando 140,043 100 1999 
Visteon (USA) Halla Climate Control Co 110,000 70 2000 
SUN Sage (NED) Mando 150,873 83 1999 
Nippon Denso (JAP) Denso Poongsung 1,936 51 2001 
Source: Compiled from MOCIE D/B on FDI in Korea, 2002.  
 
?
with the Korean companies. 
In the process of restructuring of automobile and parts industry, the existing 
relationships between automobile assemblers and parts suppliers began to be 
dissolved. Conventionally, the automobile parts suppliers, whether they are 
subsidiary or independent company, were as subcontractors hierarchically 
organized by automobile assemblers, and the hierarchical relationships was 
determined according to Chaebol grouping. The restructuring of Chaebols and 
their automobile companies caused this hierarchical relationships to change, even 
though it is prevailing until now. Further, the existence of foreign companies offers 
a new opportunity to parts suppliers. As foreign contractors do not need stick to 
the existing relationships, so domestic suppliers would have better leverage than 
the past.  
Since the restructuring process is still undergoing, it is too early to presuppose 
any uniform pattern in business relationships and networks in Korea’s automobile 
and parts industry. But it is clear that the conventional business relationships 
based on Chaebol grouping will be no longer as dominant as in the past years. And 
both smaller and lager firms should be more global in their business strategies and 
practices. 
?
?
3. The Emergence of Innovation Networks 
 
Based on cross-shareholding, subsidiary companies in a Chaebol are mostly 
vertically integrated. Vertical integration can be seen in that subsidiary companies 
in a Chaebol take part in various stages of a supply chain. Diversified business 
structures of Chaebols might allow to developing horizontal division of labor 
among subsidiary companies of a Chaebol; but, horizontal relationships between 
???? ? ? ?  ???????????????? 
Chaebols or subsidiary companies of different Chaebols are less prevalent. The 
expansion strategy of Chaebols, which aims to widen business areas as possible, 
results in more diversified business structures for Chaebols; but, it obstructs the 
development of horizontal relationships between companies, in particular those 
between Chaebols and SMEs. 
The business relationships that were prevalent in the past years have been 
changing after the financial crisis. Chaebols could no more pursue as aggressively 
as in the past the expansion strategy based on debt financing and cross-
shareholding. Instead, they had to substantially lower their debt-ratios and to 
rationalize their diversified business structures. The new strategy was to 
concentrate on core businesses and to sell out or spin off unprofitable businesses. 
As is shown in the Table 8, 442 business branches that had employed 67,863 people 
had been spun off to independent companies. Samsung has rendered 161 spin-off 
companies, followed by Hyundai with 98 companies, LG with 94 companies and 
SK with 45 companies. Spinn-off companies from these four Chaebols account for 
398 companies, more than 90 % out of total. The number of spin-off companies 
peaked at the year of 1998, when the repercussions of the financial crisis on the 
corporate restructuring were also at its highest.  
The increasing tendency of large enterprises to make strategic alliances with 
venture companies is another new trend that has occurred since the financial crisis. 
 
 
<Table 8> Spin-offs from Chaebols 
No. of spin-off companies  No. of  
mother co. 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Total 
No. of employees 
Samsung 
Hyundai 
LG 
SK 
Hanjin 
POSCO 
Hanwha 
Doosan 
Ssangyong 
Dongbu 
Dongyang 
Hyosung 
CJ 
Kolon 
Hyundai Dept. 
Daewoo E. 
16 
12 
15 
11 
5 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
3 
3 
1 
1 
0 
36 
5 
3 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
115 
27 
18 
11 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
5 
0 
2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
29 
18 
51 
11 
4 
0 
4 
0 
0 
1 
2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
4 
5 
8 
14 
13 
1 
1 
0 
3 
2 
1 
1 
0 
1 
3 
0 
0 
12 
9 
6 
7 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
4 
0 
1 
0 
161 
98 
94 
45 
5 
1 
4 
4 
2 
9 
3 
2 
6 
3 
1 
4 
17,235 
16,937 
21,443 
3,650 
2,866 
40 
2,636 
103 
880 
144 
227 
52 
643 
289 
658 
60 
Total 76 47  
(10.6) 
178 
(40.3) 
124 
(28.1) 
53 
(12.0) 
40 
(9.0) 
442 
(100.0) 
67,863 
Note: Spin-off is confined to the cases of MBO (management buy-out) and EBO (employee buy-out).  
Source: Federation of Korean Industry, 2001. 
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strategic alliances had been more prevalent between large enterprises; but it was 
hard to find those between large enterprises and SMEs before the financial crisis. 
Two factors, among others, are worth to note. First, backed by the expansion 
strategy, large enterprises, particularly Chaebols, usually set up their own business 
branches or subsidiaries when new opportunities arose or found. In other words, 
large enterprises preferred to internalize new business opportunities rather than to 
externalize them. The second factor was that since the number of technologically 
advanced SMEs had been few, the number of partners for alliances with LEs was 
also few. Under these circumstances, strategic alliances between firms, particularly 
between LEs and SMEs, will not be well developed. 
The situations described above have also been changed since the financial crisis. 
Because of the more stringent financial constraint, LEs should concentrate on core 
businesses. Spinning-off, as is explained above, is other side of the concentration. 
And there come a large number of technologically agile smaller companies. These 
changes have rendered a new trend of increasing strategic alliances between LEs 
and SMEs.  
Table 9 shows some examples of strategic alliances between LEs and new 
technology based firms, or venture companies in the Korean parlance. Samsung 
Electronics’ strategic alliances with about 100 venture companies focus on non-
memory chips where it has the strong necessity to enter into and needs business 
partners. LG Electronics runs what they call LG Venture Club composed of venture 
companies founded by retirees from LG Electronics or other LG companies. (See 
below for details on LG Venture Club.) LG Chemical has made strategic alliance 
with four venture companies and plans to increase the number of partners. SK and 
CJ are collaborating with venture companies for R&D projects for entering into 
new businesses where they do not have competence.  
Although there is no complete information on the new business relationships 
between LEs and SMEs such as in Table 9, we can further assume that strategic 
alliances and other kinds of business relationships between LEs and SMEs are 
rapidly increasing. There are, at least, two grounds for the assumption. First, the 
necessity of strategic alliances is stronger than before the financial crisis. When LEs  
 
 
[Table 9] Strategic Alliances between LE and Venture Company 
Samsung Electronics Strategic alliance with about 100 venture companies. Focusing  on non-memory chips 
LG Electronics LG Venture Club 
LG Chemical Made alliances with 2 domestic and 2 overseas venture companies 
SK Project for developing pharmaceutical products with 11 venture companies 
CJ Project for developing pharmaceutical products with 2 venture  companies. Plan to make alliances with 20 venture companies 
Source: Dong-A Ilbo, March 27, 2002. 
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need to enter into new businesses, partnership with NTBF(new technology-based 
firms) will be less costly and risky than total internalization. Second, smaller NTBF 
will have an incentive to make alliances with LEs that have advantages of scale 
economies. Partnership with LEs will allow NTBF to safeguard their growth by 
utilizing LEs’, for example, capital and marketing advantages. 
 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
 
The paper showed that industrial innovation system after the financial crisis is 
changing, in a positive direction. The financial crisis and subsequent restructuring 
have rendered new constraints and incentives for firms, particularly in their inter-
firm relations. As North (1990) notes, institutions structure incentives in economic 
action. Apparently, the financial crisis has rendered an institutional change that 
gives different incentives to economic agent and, consequently, results in different 
modes of inter-firm relations. The process of structural change is still on the way, 
and it will take further times for the new modes to be settled down. But we can 
make a conjecture on the future patterns of inter-firm relations and linkages. Orru 
et al (1996) had compared organizational patters of three East Asian economies, 
benchmarked with three European economies. Despite the danger of over-
simplification, they placed Korea as the prototypical case of the dirigiste capitalism. 
Under dirigiste capitalism where the state wields authoritative leadership and 
large corporations dominant in the national economic activities, autonomous 
conglomerates are modal means of organization, firms are vertically integrated, 
and horizontal linkages among firms are not well developed. The changes 
proceeding in Korea’s industrial innovation system show that, although it is too 
premature to generalize, more horizontal inter-firm relations are being developed 
in the Korean industries. The inter-firm relations or networking between firms 
would proceed in various ways, but the paper showed that the emerging pattern is 
different from the past one, and some industries such as automobile parts industry 
show that the changes are fundamental. Further, we can predict that the 
development of horizontal inter-firm relations and innovation networks will 
contribute to enhancing productivity economy as a whole. It is not yet possible to 
have comprehensive evidence but it is clear that R&D networking between firms 
have been rapidly risen recent years. The emerging new trend will enable firms to 
do R&D activities more efficiently by utilizing external R&D sources through 
innovation networks.  
The Korean economy is facing a new environment. As economic activities are 
becoming more knowledge-intensive, so the transition to the knowledge-based 
economy requires significant changes in work and production organizations. That 
the Korean economy has matured and developed at a level comparable to 
advanced economies implies that the available stock of technologies drawn on 
through conventional technology transfer is exhausted. The trend toward 
globalization emphasizes the importance of the global integration of national 
??????? ?????????? ????????????? ?????? ????????’??????????????????????? ??????????? ?????????????? 
economic activities. How well is the Korean firm responding to these changes? Can 
the Korean economy achieve sustainable economic growth in the future? Under the 
new economic setting, the conventional ways of technological development will 
not be as effective as they have been in the past. Standing at the crossroads, private 
enterprises need a new strategy. Korea’s industrial innovation system faces further 
challenges ahead including the following.  
First, the industrial structure shows the weakness of upstream sectors, 
particularly in the capital goods industry. This weakness is closely related to the 
predominance of large firms, notably Chaebols, and the government's industrial 
policy. In accordance with the aggressive export-promotion policy that 
complements the limited domestic market, the imported technologies are both 
mature in life cycle and of kind being able to render economies of scale in 
production. The production structure has centred on end products, and ignoring 
support firms and industries has resulted in heavy dependence on the foreign 
sources of materials, parts, and components. This chronic phenomenon renders the 
Korean economy vulnerable to external changes in the foreign market. Accordingly, 
strengthening upstream industrial linkages is one of the most urgent tasks for the 
Korean economy. 
Second, related to the first issue, a small number of Chaebols are still 
dominating industrial innovation activities. The dominance of Chaebols, per se, is 
not an evil. The problem lies in the diffusion of innovation. The internal diffusion 
of technological innovation is not so active in Korea. The lack of domestic diffusion 
among firms is well demonstrated by the fact that repetitive importation of foreign 
technologies is common. Furthermore, the diffusion from research institutions to 
private firms is not as effective as expected. More organic co-operation between 
domestic firms, particularly between large firms and SMEs, and more active 
collaboration between research institutions and private firms are imminent. In this 
regard, we have observed a positive sign of change, for example, the emergence of 
innovation networks between conglomerates and SME. It is needed to sustain this 
trend.  
Third, technological co-operation between domestic firms and foreign firms 
should be promoted. In the past, the Korean economy has benefited from the 
inflow of advanced foreign technologies. Now, new modes of co-operation such as 
cross-licensing and strategic alliances need to be utilised more. Facing rapid 
changes in technological opportunities and the expansion of globalisation, private 
enterprises need to strengthen the development of human resources and 
international R&D networks.  
???? ? ? ?  ???????????????? 
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